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CONTRIBUTION-An Application of the Oklahoma
Contribution Statute to Joint Tort-Feasors
More than fifty years ago, Oklahoma enacted a statute
for the apparent purpose of subjecting joint tort-feasors to
contribution.1 Until recently there has been a marked absence of any reference to the statute by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. However, in the rehearing of National Trailer Convoy,
Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority2 in October 1967, the
court, faced with the task of determining the force and effect
of the statute, rejected its applicability to joint tort-feasors.
As a general rule, at common law, there was no right
of contribution among joint tort-feasors.3 The courts followed the underlying principle that the law should not allow
a party to recover for his own wrongdoing. However, contribution was allowed where the liability of the joint tortfeasor who satisfied a judgment arose from acts of omission
on his part, but where the proximate cause of the injury
resulted from the active, positive acts on the part of the
other joint tort-feasor. 4 Thus, contribution was not allowed
when the party seeking it was presumed to have known he
was committing a wrongful act or where the act committed
was illegal.
In 1893, the first session of the Second Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Oklahoma enacted the state's
first statute concerning contribution.5 The statute was adopted
in its entirety from Kansas law. 6 The relevant portion read
as follows:
When property, liable to an execution against several
persons, is sold thereon, and more than a due proportion
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 831 (1961).
2 38 OKLA. B.J. 1965 (Okla. 1967).
3 See Annot., 60 A.L.R. 2d 1366 (1958).
4 See 18 C.J.S. Contribution § 11 (1939).
5 Ch. 66, § 495, [1893J Okla. Laws.
6 Ch. 80, § 480, [1868] Kan. Laws (repealed 1963).
1
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of the judgment is laid upon the property of one of them,
or one of them pays, without a sale, more than his proportion, he may compel contribution from the others ....
In 1903, the Kansas Supreme Court held the Kansas contribution statute applicable to actions founded in tort.8 Its
decision stemmed from an earlier action in which a city and
a railroad company were held jointly liable for maintaining
a dangerous trestle over a city street. The railroad had satisfied the joint judgment and sought to secure judgment for
contribution against the city. In affirming the district court's
decision, the court held that:
The statute, in terms, covers all kinds of judgments. No
exception is made. We think it applies to judgments
rendered in actions sounding in tort as well as to those
based upon contract.9
In Fakes v. Price,10 a case decided in 1907 by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the common law rule was followed.
Making no reference to the Oklahoma statute or the Kansas
court's decision, the court said: "It is a well-established rule
that among wrongdoers the law raises no implied promise or
right of contribution....""
However, the case involved the
commission of a fraud by several defendants, one of whom
had satisfied the judgments for costs and was seeking contribution. The court held that court costs did not fall within
the general rule denying contribution for damage judgments
and allowed plaintiff to recover.
In 1910, the Oklahoma statute was revised for the
apparent purpose of making it applicable to all judgments
in order to include joint tort-feasors.12 The revision consisted
7Ch. 66, § 495, [1893] Okla. Laws.
8 City of Ft. Scott v. Kansas City, Ft.S & M.R.R., 66 Kan. 610,
72 P. 238 (1903).
0 72 P. at 239.
10 18 Okla. 413, 89 P. 1123 (1907).
11 Id. at 414, 89 P. at 1124.
12 Ch. 60, § 5188, [1910] Okla. Rev. Laws.
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of the addition to the existing statute of the following
italicized portion:
When property, liable to an execution against several
persons, is sold thereon, and more than a due proportion
of the judgment is laid upon the property of one
of them, or one of them pays, without a sale, more than
his proportion, he may regardless of the nature of
the demand upon which the judgment was rendered,
compel contribution from the others ....
The revised statute represents the Oklahoma law today.13
In 1923, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized the
right of contribution between joint tort-feasors in Fleming
v. Stephenson.14 However, the case was dismissed as a result
of the court's finding that the defendant was not a party
to the fraud upon which the original action against the joint
tort-feasors was based. The issue in the case was whether
"ias a matter of law.., plaintiff was entitled to contribution."16
The court stated:
We conclude that before the plaintiff... may have a
recovery against [the defendant] there must be a
showing of some kind that there was some sort of joint
legal liability on the part of the plaintiff and defendant
A joint legal liability might grow out of one or
both of two conditions-one emanating from a contractual relation, either express or implied; and the other
arising by reason of a judgment fixing the liability.10
The first case in which the Oklahoma court confronted
and rejected the theory of contribution between joint tortfeasors was Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Company. 7 In this
case the defendant contractor had constructed a transformer
and substation for a gypsum company. An employee of the
gypsum company was electrocuted while attempting to cut
13 OKLA.STAT. tit.
14 94 Okla. 1, 220

12, § 831 (1961).
P. 599 (1923).

15 Id. at 5, 220 P. at 603.
16 Id.
17

131 Okla. 25, 267 P. 641 (1928).
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off the electric current in the substation. In an earlier suit,
the deceased's widow had recovered against the gypsum
company, and the company's insurer paid the face amount
of the policy in partial satisfaction of the judgment. When
an action was brought by the gypsum company against the
contractor, the insurer was made a party plaintiff. The insurer claimed its subrogation right to recover the policy
amount from the defendant contractor. The court pointed
out that "as between tort-feasors, there can be neither contribution nor indemnity .... ,.8 It concluded that since the
gypsum company was not entitled to indemnity, no right of
subrogation existed in favor of the insurance company. In
finding the gypsum company was not without knowledge of
the dangerous condition existing at the substation, the court
removed the case from the possible exception regarding acts
of omission. Upon the determination that the company's act
was outside the scope of the exception, the court reverted to
the common law rule and granted the defendant a directed
verdict.
In recent years the federal courts have had two occasions
to interpret Oklahoma's contribution laws. In United States
v. Acord,19 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated
that Oklahoma did not recognize contribution or indemnity
between joint tort-feasors.20 The case arose because of an
injury received by Acord, a business invitee of the Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company; he was struck
by a mail pouch thrown from a moving train by a mail clerk
employed by the United States. Acord brought an action
against the railroad company, and the railroad company impleaded the United States as a third party defendant. The
federal district court entered judgment in favor of Acord
against the railroad company and against the United States in
favor of the railroad company. On appeal, the United States
18 Id. at 28, 267 P. at 642.

19 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954).
20 Id. at 714 (citing the Fakes and Cain decisions).
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urged that the railroad company was not entitled to indemnity.
The appellate court found the railroad company and the United
States primarily negligent, and that according to Oklahoma
law the railroad company was not entitled to indemnity.
Likewise, in Calvery v. Peak Drilling Company21 the federal
district court upheld the third party defendant's motion to
dismiss the third party complaint when it recognized that
the general prevailing rule of law in Oklahoma prohibited
contribution or indemnity between joint tort-feasors.
The National Trailer case arose from a wrongful death
action involving an automobile collision on the Will Rogers
Turnpike which culminated in deceased's administratrix recovering a judgment against defendants, National Trailer Convoy, Inc. and the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority.2 2 Thereafter, the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority entered into an
agreement in which the administratrix, for a specified consideration, agreed to proceed solely against the trailer company for the balance owed on the judgment. The trailer
company paid the balance and brought the instant action
against the turnpike authority for contribution of its proportionate share.
In its initial decision the court said:
A relatively large majority of jurisdictions in which the
contribution rights of negligent joint tort-feasors are
not controlled by statute hold that the fact that joint
tort-feasors' injury-causing conduct was negligent,
rather than wilful or intentional, furnishes no basis for
freeing them of the burden of the general rule that there
can be no contribution among joint tort-feasors.2
The plaintiff recognized the general rule but urged that
it was subject to an exception which permits contribution
21
22
2

118 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Saul, 375 P.2d 922 (Okla.
1962).
National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 38 OKLA. B.J. 57, 60 (1967) (quoting Annot., 60 A.L.R.
2d 1366, 1373 (1958)) (emphasis added).
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where the joint tort-feasors were not the primary wrongdoers or guilty of active negligence. It was plaintiff's contention that its employee was the active wrongdoer and
that both plaintiff and defendant were guilty only of constructive fault. The court rejected this contention by referring to the jury's determination that plaintiff was primarily
negligent.
On rehearing, plaintiff urged the court to consider and
24
determine the force and effect of the Oklahoma statute.
Basing his argument upon the Kansas court's interpretation
of the Kansas statute and the apparent purpose of the addition to the Oklahoma statute, plaintiff contended that the
Oklahoma contribution statute was in derogation of the common law rule. In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the court
held the statute procedural in nature and dependent upon
another statute or the common law for the existence of a
right of contribution.
In classifying the statute as procedural the court stated:
[Statutes of this character] constitute a change in procedural, rather than substantive law, and, manifestly,
if the clear purpose of such a statute is to make the
summary remedy available to the judgment debtor who
is entitled to contribution, it is not applicable to the case
of a defendant whose payment of the judgment gives
him no right to contribution. 25
It is submitted that the clear purpose of the statute was to
abrogate a right of the joint tort-feasor existing at common
law and to supersede it with a statutory right to contribution.
The purpose becomes more apparent when one inquires
into the intent of the legislature in making the addition to
the existing statute of the words, "regardless of the nature
of the demand upon which the judgment was rendered." If
any effect is to be given to the addition, it must be construed
24
21

38 OiLA. B.J. 1965 (Okla. 1967).
Id. at 1966 (quoting 18 Am. JuR. 2d Contribution § 77 (1965))
(court's emphasis deleted; writer's emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss1/5

6

Holder: Contribution--An Application of the Oklahoma Contribution Statute

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5, No. 1

as subjecting joint tort-feasors to contribution. The court,
however, concludes that the word "demand" in the added
phrase includes too great a variety of meanings; and if
plaintiff's contention were approved, the result would be to
grant the right of contribution in numerous situations where
they were previously denied.
Rejecting the 1903 decision construing the Kansas contribution statute, the Oklahoma court points out that subsequent Kansas decisions have not cited that decision for the
point of law in question. In effect, the court is holding that
this was not the controlling rule in Kansas. However, in
referring to the Kansas court's interpretation of its contribution statute, a Kansas judge in 1958 stated that the Kansas
statute was applicable to tort actions where a joint judgment
had been rendered.

26

The court notes the Kansas statute was replaced in
196327 and that a 1966 Kansas decision followed the common law rule.2 8 Because the Oklahoma statute has not been

amended since 1910, it is submitted that the 1966 Kansas
decision has no bearing upon the statute in question.
Referring to an earlier decision the court held that "a
valuable right existing by common law will not be abrogated
by a subsequent statute which did not expressly, nor by
necessary implication, destroy such previously existing right.29
However, in an earlier decision, the court made the following
statement:
No authority is necessary to sustain the proposition that
repeals by implication are not to be favored, and that to
28
27
28

29

See Gard, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(As Revised), 27 K.A.. B.J. 2 (1958).
-See Kw.

STAT.

AqNo. § 60-2413 (1964).

38 OKLA. B.J. at 1967. See Alseike v. Miller, 196 Kan. 547,
412 P.2d 1007 (1966).
38 OiLA. B.J. at 1967 (citing, Roxana Petroleum Co. v.
Cope, 132 Okla. 152, 269 P. 1084 (1928)).
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strike down a valuable right given by a statute and also
existing by common law, merely upon an inference to
be drawn from a new statute, represents an unhappy
manner of adjudicating those rights and holding that
they no longer exist.30
Although the right to refuse contribution did exist at common
law, Oklahoma has no statute conferring this right. Thus,
it seems appropriate to distinguish the earlier decision and
negate its applicability.
In refusing to take away a valuable substantive right
existing at common law, the court has apparently taken away
a statutory right. The result is the usurption of the legislative branch of Oklahoma government. Refusals to allow
contribution in this field has led to several proposalsP1 to
adopt the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act. The
original version of the act was promulgated in 1939 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. By 1955, the Act, which clarifies the ambiguities that
existed in the common law rules governing joint tort-feasors,
had been adopted by eleven states.3 2 As adopted by New
Mexico, 33 it creates the right of contribution among joint
tort-feasors. However, the right to contribution does not
accrue until after discharge by one of the tort-feasors of the
common liability or until a discharge is made of more than
his share. The law applies regardless of whether the joint
tort-feasors were joined in the original action, but it is not
available to one who intentionally contributed to the injury.
loxana Petroleum Co. v. Cope, 132 Okla. 152, 153, 269 P.
1084, 1085 (1928) (emphasis added).
3: See Comment, Contribution: Between Joint Debtors Exclusive of Contract Express or Implied, 8 OKLA. L.R. 349,
353 (1958); see also Fraser, Joint Tortfeasors, 29 OKLA. B.J.
1933 (1958); Merrill, Oklahoma and the Uniform State Law
Program,1966, 38 OLA. B.J. 643 (1967).
82 States which have adopted the Act include Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island and South Dakota.
.13 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-12 to -18 (1953).
30
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The act as adopted by New Mexico would seem to clarify the
problem areas in Oklahoma and effectuate the legislative
purpose which has long been ignored and now rejected.
A revision of the Act was promulgated in 1955 and has
been adopted by at least two states.3 4 The purpose of the
revision was to eliminate the objectionable portions of the
Act concerning settlements and the use of equitable principles
in the determination of contributive shares3,5
In National Trailer the Oklahoma court was admittedly
faced with a difficult question. To have recognized the legislative purpose of the statute, the court would have overruled
sixty years of prior case law. However, the continued history
of the misapplication of Oklahoma's contribution statute and
its final rejection indicates the need for clarification of the
statute as a guideline for the Oklahoma courts. Amending
the statute would only cloud the areas of contribution among
joint debtors and sureties to whom it is now being applied.
Therefore, adoption of the revised Uniform Contribution
Among Tort-feasors Act is suggested as a possible solution.
Jerrell Holder

States which have adopted the revised Act include North
Dakota and Massachusetts.
85 Merrill, supra note 31, at 649.
34
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